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The 1994 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) human reliability analysis (HRA) methodology
was developed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) in 1994 by the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL).  It was decided to revise that
methodology for use by the Simplified Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) program.  The 1994 ASP
HRA methodology was compared, by a team of analysts, on a point-by-point basis to a variety of
other HRA methods and sources.  This paper briefly discusses how the comparisons were made
and how the 1994 ASP HRA methodology was revised to incorporate desirable aspects of other
methods.  The revised methodology was renamed the SPAR HRA methodology.
INTRODUCTION
The 1994 Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP)
human reliability analysis (HRA) methodology was
developed for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(USNRC) in 1994 by the Idaho National Engineering
and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) (Blackman and
Byers, 1995a). This 1994 methodology made use of a
two-page worksheet to rate a series of performance
shaping factors (PSFs) and dependency factors to arrive
at a screening level human error probability (HEP) for a
given task.  Noteworthy features of the 1994
methodology were a derivation of PSFs from a
psychological model of human behavior (Blackman and
Byers, 1995b), and an explicit dependency model.
However, when compared to the open literature and
Individual Plant Evaluation HRA data, the dynamic
range for HEPs in the 1994 methodology was limited.
Also, based on initial use, the taxonomy for
distinguishing the processing (cognition) portion of a
task from the response (action) portion of the task was
somewhat difficult for non-human factors/HRA
professionals to apply.  The INEEL was tasked by the
USNRC to revise the 1994 ASP HRA methodology for
use in the Simplified Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR)
program.  A full description of the revision process,
along with new SPAR HRA Worksheets and
Definitions, was developed.
This paper will focus on why and how the 1994
ASP HRA methodology was compared to other HRA
methods during the revision process.  The results of the
comparison, including the detailed descriptions and
quantitative information, could not be included here
because of paper length restrictions.
PURPOSE OF COMPARISONS
The initial task in revising the 1994 ASP HRA
methodology was to compare it to other existing HRA
methods and to other sources of HRA information.  The
primary purpose of these comparisons was, of course, to
systematically evaluate possibilities for enhancement of
the 1994 ASP HRA methodology.  The comparison took
place on several levels.  The first was to compare the
actual methods themselves, that is, how is information
on human tasks and human performers manipulated to
assess human reliability?  The second comparison level
was to compare the topics and extent of information on
tasks and performers that the methods use (e.g., error
types and PSFs used).  Finally, a comparison of the
quantification aspects of the methods was performed to
look at the methods and numbers used to obtain a human
error probability.  All three levels of comparison
provided information for enhancements made to the
1994 ASP HRA methodology, which resulted in the
SPAR HRA methodology.  No benchmarking across the
methods for a specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment
sequence was performed.  This exercise is being
considered for the next project phase.
HRA COMPARISON METHODS
On the basis of either relatively widespread usage,
or recognized contribution as a newer contemporary
technique, five HRA methods were chosen for
comparison. The methods were:
• Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction
(THERP) (Swain and Guttmann, 1983)
• Accident Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP)
(Swain, 1987)
• Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method
(CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998)
• Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique
(HEART) (Williams, 1988)
• A Technique for Human Event Analysis
(ATHEANA) (USNRC, 1998)
Note that of the five methods listed above, only
ASEP qualifies as a screening method.  The others
either contain aspects of screening methods or can be
truncated and used in that fashion.  In addition to these
five methods, other sources of information were also
examined for insights about the treatment of human
error. These sources were:
• Individual Plant Evaluations (IPEs) (USNRC, 1988;
USNRC, 1997)
• Nuclear Computerized Library for Assessing
Reactor Reliability (NUCLARR) (Reece et al.,
1994)
• Human Performance Event Database (HPED) (S.G.
Hill, personal communication, November 1998)
• JHEDI (Kirwan, 1997)
• Quantification of Errors of Intention (INTENT)
(Gertman et al., 1990)
• Framework Assessing Notorious Contributing
Influences for Error (FRANCIE) (Ostrom et al.,
1997)
• Human Cognitive Reliability/ Operator Reliability
Experiment (HCR/ORE) (Hannaman, Spurgin and
Lukic, 1985, Moieni et al.,1994)
• 1994 ASP HRA Methodology user history.
HOW COMPARISONS WERE MADE
The first step of the comparison was the assembly of
a team of analysts (the authors of this report) with HRA
knowledge.  Next, each analyst was asked to review one
or more of the methods and sources, and to prepare a
precis for presentation and discussion at a team meeting.
For this initial review and discussion, reviewers were
asked to familiarize (or re-familiarize) themselves with
the method and to concentrate on the overall method,
that is, how is information on human tasks and human
performers manipulated to assess human reliability?
Presentation and discussion of the initial reviews
resulted in the basic outlines of the enhancement of the
1994 ASP HRA methodology.  It became evident that
the method of assigning base error rates for specific error
types and then modifying those base rates through the
operation of PSFs and dependency effects could be
retained.  However, some continued consideration was
given to other methods, in particular the CREAM
method of separate bins corresponding to control modes.
This continued consideration, however, did not result in
any changes being made to the basic 1994 method of
modifying base error rates.
Once the initial review and discussion were
completed, the team members were asked to construct
more detailed summaries of their methods and sources,
including specific lists of: 1) error types; 2) any base
rates associated with the error types; 3) PSFs; 4) PSF
weights, and; 5) dependency factors.  Of course, not all
methods and sources contained all of this information,
and certainly not all used the same terminology of error
types and PSFs.
Next, the information gathered from the various
methods and sources was compared to the 1994 ASP
HRA methodology.  The PSFs from the 1994 ASP HRA
methodology, with their associated definitions, were
listed.  The information from each of the other methods
was reviewed, one method at a time.  The PSFs were
matched based on the 1994 ASP PSF definitions, the
other method definitions (if available), and the analysts’
judgment and knowledge of human performance.  Most
PSFs could be matched.  Different words might be used,
but the underlying concepts were so similar as to make
the appropriate match clear.  For example, the 1994 ASP
methodology had a PSF category of “poor ergonomics”
while HEART had a PSF related to “unreliable
instrumentation.”  However, it was clear from the 1994
ASP definition that these PSFs could be matched.
Two points should be made about the PSF
comparisons.  One is that the PSFs in the different
methods were often at different levels of detail.  The
previous example of “poor ergonomics” and “unreliable
instrumentation” shows PSFs at two levels of detail.
“Unreliable instrumentation” is a specific example of
“poor ergonomics.”  Poor ergonomics also encompasses
many other aspects such as poor workstation design,
poorly designed displays and controls, and poor
labeling.  Therefore, “unreliable instrumentation” can
be thought of as a subset of “poor ergonomics.”
However, the matching and comparison are still useful
even if PSFs are at different levels of detail.  First, the
additional detail provides input for a better and more
expanded definition of the SPAR PSF, so as to include
as many concepts explored by other methods as
possible.  And, in looking to see how the related PSF
weights compare, PSF weight multipliers of subsets of
the SPAR PSF of interest are still useful.
The second point to be made is that the 1994 ASP
HRA methodology divided each human task into a
processing component and a response component
(changed to diagnosis and action components in the
SPAR methodology).  Therefore, in making
comparisons between 1994 ASP HRA PSFs and
another method’s PSFs, the analysts had to maintain
awareness of the differences between processing and
response, and if the PSF specifically addressed one or
both aspects of the human task.  For example, in
HEART, the PSF that describes “a danger that finite
physical capabilities will be exceeded” is clearly related
only to operator responses or actions, and not to
operator processing.
In a manner similar to the PSF matching, the base
error types from the other methods were matched to the
1994 ASP HRA error types.  This matching was
considerably easier than the PSF matching.  It was
easier because it was relatively easy to judge whether or
not other error types corresponded to either or both of
the processing and response error types of the 1994
ASP HRA methodology.
METHODOLOGY REVISION
At this point, revision of the 1994 ASP HRA PSFs
began.  The changes made at this stage were in error
types, definitions of error types, in PSFs, and in the
definitions of the PSFs.  Changes were made on the
basis of a general trend in the methods, such as “The
raters don’t understand the processing/ response
dichotomy and most of the other methods recognize
separate diagnosis and action error types” or “Most of
the other methods have organizational factors as a PSF.”
Changes were also made to ensure the SPAR HRA
methodology would be as broad in coverage as possible,
for example, the definition of “context” in the SPAR
HRA definitions was broadened.
Once the changes in error types and PSFs were
made, new matching lists were created for error types
and PSFs.  Next, comparison matrices were created (one
for the new diagnosis error type, one for the new action
error type) that showed the comparison of PSFs and their
weight multipliers in table form.  A table was also
created showing the two 1994 ASP PSF base error types
with the matching error types and base rates from the
other methods.  Creating this table was somewhat
problematic since many of the error types in the other
methods incorporated one or more PSFs.  For example,
the HEART error type, “Shift or restore system to a new
or original state on a single attempt without supervision
or procedures” incorporates aspects of the procedures
PSF and the work processes PSF.  Thus it was somewhat
difficult to find base rates which were truly comparable.
After the comparison matrices had been completed,
analyzed, and digested, changes were made to the ASP
HRA PSF weights.  Changes were driven by several
considerations.  Consonance with the other methods was
the first of these.  Second was the user desire to achieve
realistic values, and third was to maintain as many of the
1994 ASP HRA values as possible, since they had been
at least partially validated.  A final consideration was to
examine differences between the two error types in PSF
weights.
Finally, consideration was given to changing the
1994 ASP HRA error type base error rates.  However, no
compelling reason was found for changing them and no
changes were made to these rates.
SUMMARY
Overall, as a result of the comparison of the 1994
ASP HRA methodology to other methods and sources,
enhancements were made in error type names, error type
definitions, PSFs, PSF weights, PSF definitions,
dependency conditions and dependency definitions.  No
changes were made to the base error weights.  Each task
no longer has to be rated on both processing (diagnosis)
and response (action) components, only if the task
contains diagnosis does diagnosis get rated, and
similarly for action.  Changes were also made to the
worksheet to enhance usability and to gather more
information when non-nominal ratings are made.
Examples drawn from the Human Performance Events
Database (Schurman et al., 1998) have been added to
increase rater understanding of the PSFs and PSF levels.
The overall range of possible HEPs has been expanded.
As they now stand, SPAR HRA methodology error
types, error type base weights, PSFs, and PSF weights
are roughly comparable (given the different levels of
granularity of the methods) to those of the other HRA
methods.
The enhanced SPAR HRA methodology is useful as
an easy-to-use, broadly applicable, HRA screening tool.
The comparisons and enhancements described in this
paper allow the SPAR HRA methodology to maintain
the strengths of the original 1994 ASP HRA
methodology, while taking advantage of the information
available from user feedback and from other HRA
methods and sources.  The SPAR HRA methodology
has been and is being used successfully in several
applications, most recently in the Spent Fuel Pool
Analysis for the USNRC.
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